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 Much work has documented that African-American students are more likely to receive 
expulsions and suspensions than their white peers. These disparities are troubling, but researchers and 
policymakers need more information to fully understand this issue. We use three years of student-level 
discipline data for an entire state to assess whether non-white students are receiving different 
disciplinary consequences from their white peers in the same schools, for similar infractions and with 
similar behavioral history. We find that Black students received more severe (longer) punishments than 
their White peers in the state for the same types of infractions. These differences are due primarily to 
school-level differences, but even within the same schools, Black students receive slightly longer 
punishments than their White peers. 
 








Since the early 1990s, many schools have adopted zero tolerance policies in response to fears 
of violence. This approach removes students from school for violations ranging from serious offenses 
like violent behavior to less serious offenses such as dress code violations or truancy (Losen & Skiba, 
2010; Skiba, 2014; Skiba & Peterson, 1999;). While it may be necessary, in extreme cases, to remove a 
student from campus, many fear this movement has gone too far. Zero tolerance policies and 
exclusionary discipline such as expulsions and suspensions are associated with lower academic 
achievement (Beck & Muschkin, 2012; Raffaele-Mendez, 2003; Raffaele-Mendez, Knoff, & Ferror, 
2002; Skiba & Rausch, 2004), school dropout (American Academy of Pediatrics, 2013; American 
Psychological Association, 2008; Ekstrom, Goertz, Pollack, & Rock, 1986), and involvement in the 
juvenile justice system (American Academy of Pediatrics, 2013; Balfanz, Spiridakis, Neild, & Legters, 
2003; Fabelo et al., 2011; Nicholson-Crotty, Birchmeier, & Valentine, 2009). 
One particularly troubling by-product of the increased use of exclusionary discipline is the 
growing evidence that such disciplinary practices are employed disproportionately for students from 
marginalized groups. Numerous researchers have documented differences in suspension rates between 
White students and students of color (Anyon et al., 2014; Losen, Hodson, Keith, Morrison, & Belway, 
2015; Losen & Skiba, 2010; Sartain et al., 2015; Skiba et al., 2014; Skiba, Michael, Nardo, & Peterson, 
2002; Skiba et al., 2011; Welch & Payne, 2010). In this study, we contribute to this growing base of 
evidence by assessing the extent to which Black students in Arkansas, over the past several years, have 
received more severe consequences than White students – despite being cited for similar infractions. 
This analysis makes a unique contribution both by controlling for the specific infractions leading to the 
disciplinary consequences (relatively few studies in the existing literature connect infractions to 
consequences) and by using days of suspension as the consequence measure rather than simply the 
likelihood of being suspended. While it is certainly helpful to know if Black students are more likely – 




all else equal – to receive exclusionary discipline, it is also important that we are aware of any 
disparities in the severity of the consequences given.  
In the next section, we set the context for our study by presenting the evidence from the 
literature on racial disparities in student discipline in two categories of studies. First, we discuss 
national studies that have generally relied on school-level data and provided only an overview of the 
consequences levied on students of different races. Because these studies are unable to connect 
consequences with the associated infraction referral, many questions are left unanswered. We then 
consider a second set of studies that have investigated the student and school characteristics associated 
with racial disparities in discipline within particular states or districts.  
National Overviews of Disciplinary Disproportionalities 
 Most recently, Losen et al. (2015) from the Civil Rights Project at UCLA, published a 
comprehensive report asking “Are We Closing the School Discipline Gap”? The authors focused on 
OSS rates in every U.S. school district during the 2011-12 school year. The data revealed an increase 
in suspensions over the past 40 years, as well as growth in the suspension rate gap between White 
students and students of color. In 1972-73, only 6% of Black students were suspended, as compared to 
3% of White students (and 3% of Hispanic students). By 2011-12, 16% of Black students were 
suspended; this rate was more than twice as great as for Hispanic students (7%) and more than three 
times as great as for White students (5%). The authors also found significant variability in rates across 
districts and schools, indicating that local policies influence discipline outcomes.  
 Earlier, Losen and Skiba (2010) utilized data from the Civil Rights Data Collection (CRDC) to 
analyze suspension rates for students in more than 9,200 middle schools across the nation from the 
years 2002 to 2006. Losen and Skiba (2010) focused on middle school, claiming that the relatively low 
number of suspensions in elementary school may mask disparities in middle and secondary school. 




This analysis revealed stark racial gaps in suspensions: while only 10% of White male students in 
middle school were suspended in 2006, 28% of Black male students were suspended in that same year.  
Overall, these and other analyses confirm that there are systematic racial disparities in OSS, but 
they provide little information related to the factors (including student behavior) that drive these 
disparities. Moreover, students face numerous consequences other than OSS, which these national 
studies have not investigated. 
Studies Examining the Drivers of Racial Discipline Gaps 
 Many researchers have gathered school-level and even student-level data to better understand 
the variables underlying the disparities in disciplinary outcomes (Anyon et al., 2014; Sartain et al., 
2015; Skiba et al., 2002; Skiba et al., 2011; Skiba et al., 2014; Welch & Payne, 2010). Two high-
profile studies described in this section concluded that differences in disciplinary practices and culture 
between schools fostered racial discipline gaps. (Sartain et al., 2015; Welch & Payne, 2010). That is, 
the schools Black students attended were the same schools that engaged in high levels of exclusionary 
discipline and thus, overall, disproportionate numbers of Black students faced school suspension.  
Welch and Payne (2010) used school level data from a national survey of principals in middle 
schools and high schools to ask whether school leaders in buildings serving more Black students would 
be more likely to use punitive discipline. In this analysis, the authors sought to extend the “racial threat 
hypothesis” from criminal justice research into a school context and found that principals in schools 
with higher proportions of Black students were more likely to self-report that they employ punitive 
disciplinary styles. The weakness of this study, however, was its reliance on self-reports rather than 
actual disciplinary outcomes. Moreover, the data in this study were school-level and did not indicate 
whether Black students in particular are punished more frequently. 




Researchers from the Consortium on Chicago School Research used actual student behavior 
data from roughly 85,000 high school students in Chicago in 2013-14 to further examine school level 
differences in suspensions (Sartain et al., 2015). The student-level data employed in the analysis did 
allow the researchers to look at within-school racial differences, but they concluded that the primary 
driver of the differences was the fact that Black students attended schools, on average, that issued more 
suspensions. Like the Welch and Payne (2010) study, this analysis is limited because the authors did 
not consider the actual infractions committed by students; nevertheless, these two studies provide 
evidence of the fact that principals across the country are more likely to favor punitive discipline in 
schools serving many Black students and that, in at least one large city, such schools are home to 
greater numbers of student suspensions.  
While it is helpful that researchers have documented the different disciplinary cultures and 
practices prevalent in schools serving mostly Black students, the findings are not surprising to those 
studying school discipline. Over the past 15 years or so, a number of researchers have examined 
infraction-level data to further explore other factors that might help explain the differential rates of 
punishment faced by Black students. For example, Skiba et al. (2002) used student-level data on more 
than 11,000 students from 19 middle schools in one of the largest US school districts in 1994-95 to ask 
what factors drive discipline disproportionalities by analyzing the reasons for the referrals. Skiba et al. 
(2002) discovered that, while White students were more likely to be referred for objective infractions 
like smoking or vandalism, Black students were more likely to be referred for subjective offenses such 
as disrespect and noise. Overall, Black students faced consequences more often than White students 
because they were referred to the office more often, but this does not indicate whether Black students 
were being treated unfairly if the disparities in disciplinary consequences were due to more frequent 




misbehavior by Black students. Of course, the fact that Black students were more likely to be referred 
for subjective offenses leaves open the possibility of unequal treatment by school leaders.  
 In a later study, Skiba et al. (2011) were able to dig a little deeper on the question of unequal 
treatment in an analysis of student-level data from 364 elementary and middle schools across the 
United States in 2005-06. Using logistic regression and multinomial logistic regression, the authors 
found that Black students are more likely than White students to be referred for a variety of 
disciplinary infractions, and that for the same infraction types, Blacks were significantly more likely to 
be given OSS or even expulsion. Thus, even after accounting for recorded infraction, Black students 
were more likely to receive exclusionary discipline.  
Similarly, Anyon et al. (2014) used student level data from Denver Public Schools in 2011-12, 
and found that Black, Latino, Native American, and Multiracial students have increased risk, relative 
to White students, of receiving an office referral. Further, conditional on the referral reason (infraction 
type), Black students and Multiracial students were more likely than their White peers to receive out of 
school suspensions. Another contribution of Anyon et al.’s (2014) work, is the potential usefulness of 
restorative practices and in-school suspensions as alternatives to out-of-school suspensions. Still, this 
work is limited in its scope, as it focused on a single year in a single district, and also did not include 
detailed infraction-level data, as in the current study.  
 This initial round of studies using infraction-level data supported an unfortunate but 
unsurprising conclusion: marginalized students were not only punished more often, but also received 
more severe consequences for similar infractions. It is still unclear, however, whether these disparities 
occurred because of different disciplinary practices employed in schools serving mostly marginalized 
students, or because different groups of students were treated differently within the same schools. Only 
studies that include infraction-level data along with school characteristics or school fixed effects allow 




researchers to understand the extent to which disciplinary disparities are occurring within or between 
schools. Thus far, we are aware of only one such study. 
Skiba et al. (2014) began to address this gap by introducing school characteristics into a three-
level HLM (Hierarchical Linear Modeling) analysis predicting student punishment as a function of 
infraction type. Using information from all students in the disciplinary database in a single Midwestern 
state in 2007-08, the authors found that even after controlling for type of infraction, Black students 
remained more likely to receive OSS, but statistically as likely to receive an expulsion. This analysis 
extended beyond prior work with the inclusion of school-level characteristics, such as student race and 
poverty and the principal’s attitude toward discipline. In the third level analysis, the race of the 
individual student is no longer significant; school-level variables, including the concentration of Black 
students in the school, drive the severity of the punishments allocated. Thus, these results are 
consistent with the “racial threat hypothesis” in schools suggested by Welch and Payne (2010).  
 Overall, the evidence gathered thus far indicates clear racial disparities with respect to 
exclusionary discipline. Indeed, the Office for Civil Rights recently demonstrated nationwide racial 
disparities in discipline: Black students in 2011-12 made up only 16% of the students represented in 
the Civil Rights Data Collection (CRDC), but 33% of students suspended once, 42% of those 
suspended more than once, and 34% of students expelled. While the evidence on the existence of 
disparities is strong, less is known about what actually drives these disparate outcomes. Are Black 
students simply confined to schools with more severe disciplinary practices, or are Black students 
treated differently than white students within the same school walls despite being cited for identical 
school offenses?  
While one study (Skiba et al., 2014) does find that school factors such as the concentration of 
Black students are a main driver of the severity of punishments administered, that single study has 




limitations One potential weakness of the study is the setting – a single state that serves relatively few 
poor students (fewer than 40%) and very few Black students (8%). Moreover, given the importance of 
the question, policymakers need more information than what they can glean from a single study. More 
generally, there is still little evidence on the within-school racial disparities in disciplinary outcomes, 
for students committing similar types of infractions and with similar behavioral histories. Our study 
will contribute new evidence and enhance our collective understanding of disciplinary disparities 
facing Black students in US schools.  
In addition, there is little known about how the severity of the punishment, as measured by 
number of days excluded from school, correlate with the racial background of the student? We focus in 
this study primarily on the length of suspension as a measure of the severity of a consequence, since 
suspensions and other learning time lost due to disciplinary processes are associated with lower 
academic achievement (Davis & Jordan, 1994; Public Agenda, 2004; Scott & Barrett, 2004), which is 
consistent with the mass of literature on the fact that increased opportunity for learning is associated 
with high achievement and large academic achievement gains (Brophy, 1988; Greenwood, Horton, & 
Utley, 2002; Hattie, 2002; Reynolds & Walberg, 1991; Wang, Haertel, & Walberg, 1997, among 
others). The length of a disciplinary punishment is readily interpretable and is also a detailed measure 
of a student’s removal from the traditional classroom environment. 
Research Questions 
 This study will attempt to answer two research questions: 
1) Are certain racial subgroups receiving stricter (longer) punishments, controlling for the 
infraction committed, than their White grade-level peers throughout the state? 




2) After controlling further for the school that a student attends, are certain subgroups of students 
still more likely to receive longer punishments? That is, do different students in the same 
school receive differing punishments for the same types of infractions? 
Data and Sample 
The study uses three years of de-identified student demographic and disciplinary data from all 
Arkansas K-12 schools provided by the Arkansas Department of Education (2010-11 through 2012-
13). The demographic data include gender, race, grade level, special education status, limited English 
proficiency-status, and free-and-reduced-lunch (FRL) eligibility. The discipline information includes 
indicators for 19 infraction codes and 13 consequence codes, the date of the infraction, and the length 
of the consequence (number of days). To simplify the analysis, we collapsed infraction types involving 
handguns, rifles, and shotguns into a single category, resulting in 17 distinct categories. Furthermore, 
13 consequence categories were collapsed into 7 (in school suspension (ISS), OSS, expulsion, referral 
to an alternative learning environment (ALE), corporal punishment, no action, and other).1 
 The unit of analysis for this study is the student-infraction level, so students can and often do 
have multiple observations within the same year. In some cases, there were exact duplicate records in 
the dataset, which would indicate an over reporting of a single incident. After removing duplicate 
entries (same student, date, infraction type, consequence, etc.), 651,804 total observations remain over 
the three-year period. 61,054 were excluded from the analytic sample in our preferred models due to 
                                                      
1 Our measure of out-of-school suspension includes two separately reported OSS types: Out-of-School Suspension (when 
the incident did not result in physical injury) and Out-of-School Suspension (when the incident did result in physical 
injury). Our measure of expulsion includes five separately reported expulsion types: Expelled, Expelled for Weapons (as 
defined by Federal, State, and Student Discipline Policy), Expelled for Drugs (does not include alcohol or tobacco), 
Expelled for dangerousness (the incident did not result in physical injury), and Expelled for dangerousness (the incident 
resulted in physical injury). Our measure of ALE referrals includes two separately reported consequence types: Alternative 
Learning Environment (full year) and Alternative Learning Environment (less than one year). The other three consequence 
categories are Corporal Punishment, No Action, and Other. 




missing an indicator for the number of days of punishment meted out, leaving 590,750 infractions in 
the analytic sample. The breakdown by infraction type and consequence can be seen in Tables 1 and 2.  
Limitations of the Data 
 The data utilized in this analysis are individual-level administrative data collected by the state. 
To be included in this analysis, a student must have had a reported disciplinary infraction, so the 
dataset does not include every child in the state. For each recorded incident, we have both an infraction 
and a consequence type. The state-level data only includes certain types of infractions and 
consequences, so some categories used at a local level are coded as “other” at the state level. There is 
an “other” category for both infractions and consequences, but they are not always used together. As a 
result, a large number of cases are coded as “other” in either the infraction committed, the consequence 
received, or both. Over 95% of the “Other (Non-Specified)” consequences can be attributed to four 
types of infractions: disorderly conduct, insubordination, other (non-specified) infractions, and truancy. 
In the primary analysis, we limit the impact of this uncertainty because by only including in our sample 
the “other” consequences that included a number of days. Robustness checks using different 
assumptions are provided in the Appendices as well.2 The exclusion of other (non-specified) 
consequences without a number of days listed is justified because these other (non-specified) 
consequences tend to be less severe and less exclusionary than a suspension.3  
                                                      
2 52% of incidences of “Other (Non-Specified)” consequence were dropped if and only if the data did not include a number 
of days of punishment for this consequence. If number of days was included, these infractions were included. These 
exclusions account for only about 9% of the total infractions in the dataset, and were disproportionately from the Northwest 
(46%) and Central (27%) regions of the state. Two districts make up about 59% of these infractions. See Appendix A for a 
robustness check. 
3 Conversations with the Arkansas Department of Education Assistant Commissioner for Research and Technology, Eric 
Saunders, indicates that the majority of these other consequences are detentions, bus suspensions, parent/guardian 
conferences, Saturday school, or warnings. 
 




Finally, we should also acknowledge there are still key factors that we cannot observe in this 
dataset (or in any dataset). To illustrate the sequence of events connected to school disciplinary 
infractions, we walk through a simple example.   
1) A student verbally abuses a teacher in front of a school administrator 
2) The administrator records an insubordination infraction for that student 
3) The administrator issues a 2-day ISS to the student 
Most empirical disciplinary analyses employ data from event 3. Our analysis is distinguished 
from many others in that we also have data on event 2 (the specific citation). Unfortunately, our dataset 
provides no information on the actual actions of the students and or administrators involved; we are 
unable to observe the first event from our fictitious example above. As a result, we don’t observe 
misbehaviors that were never recorded, and we do not know the severity of the infraction committed. 
Certain infraction categories are more subjective than others. For example, the three biggest categories 
of infractions (disorderly conduct (30.2%), insubordination (26.2%), and other non-specified (20.6%)) 
can include a wide range of behaviors and are subject to teacher or administrator discretion. Indeed, 
some have argued that administrator discretion in the use of citations for subjective offenses may be 
one cause of disparate disciplinary outcomes (Gregory & Weinstein, 2008; Skiba et al., 2011; Skiba et 
al., 2002). Nevertheless, our ability to at least control for the type of recorded infraction (as well as 
past infraction history) enhances our ability to identify per infraction disparities. 
Another limitation of these data is that they are reported by schools, collected by the Arkansas 
Department of Education, and then provided to us for research purposes; however, the data have not 
gone through an external validation process. While it is possible (and even likely) that school districts 
are reporting in slightly different ways, we can reduce the impact of such differences through the use 
of school-fixed effects. Furthermore, these limitations exist in most large-scale studies on school 
discipline, because there is no practical way to ensure perfectly consistent reporting across districts. 




With these limitations in mind, we now turn to the analytic methods we use to explore the relationship 
between race and disciplinary outcomes. 
Method 
Research Question 1: Are certain racial subgroups receiving stricter (longer) punishments than 
their White grade-level peers throughout the state? 
 To generate a first estimate of the relationship between race and discipline outcomes, we utilize 
Stata to estimate a multiple regression model predicting the days of punishment as a function of race 
and several control variables that could reasonably be expected to affect the level of punishment. We 
include grade level indicators because exclusionary discipline is more common in higher grades, so we 
only want to compare outcomes for student within grade. In addition, we include an indicator for 
special education status, because special education students are limited to ten consecutive days of OSS 
and face other unique circumstances that might reasonably influence the disciplinary practices for such 
students (Arkansas Department of Education, 2008).  
An important contribution of this analysis is that we are able to attach specific consequences to 
particular infraction types and the student’s behavioral history and control for this in our models. We 
include indicators for each of the 17 infraction categories plus indicators for the order of infractions. 
The order of infractions indicators include indicators for whether the infraction was that student’s first, 
second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, or seventh or more consequence within the same school in the same 
year (student-school-year), plus an indicator for the last infraction for that student-school-year. Given 
that the last infraction is more likely to be at the end of the year or perhaps the final infraction before a 
student is expelled or transfers out of a school, it makes sense to control for this variable. Further, in 
order to compare only similar consequence types, indicators for the type of consequence (ISS, OSS, 
expulsion, corporal punishment, etc.) are included. We utilize pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression with heteroskedastic robust standard errors clustered at the student level (Huber, 1967; 




White, 1980). Since the unit of analysis is the infraction, students may be included more than once, 
even within a given year, and clustered standard errors (at the student level) allows for correlation 
among multiple outcomes for an individual student.  
Another key feature of this study is our ability to consider the severity of each consequence, as 
measured by the number of days. Defining and operationalizing this outcome variable (days of 
punishment), however, took careful consideration due to the types of consequences that exist. Each 
consequence is characterized by both a type (ISS, OSS, expulsion, etc.) and an amount (such as a 
number of days in some cases). For some punishments (ISS, OSS, referral to an ALE, expulsion), 
having a number of days of punishment is clearly logical. For others, such as corporal punishment, 
instances are more important than a number of days. An “other” (non-specified) consequence is 
ambiguous.  
To create a measurable outcome variable, we focus solely on the number of days as a proxy for 
lost instructional time and we ignore the possibility that different types of consequences may vary in 
“severity”.. This adds simplicity in interpretation, but also recognizes that it is unclear how to lay out 
these punishments in an ordinal way. For example, OSS may be considered more severe than ISS to 
school personnel, but to a student, it may be viewed as a vacation from school and actually preferred; 
to be certain, both options clearly remove the student from the classroom.  
Corporal punishment presents a unique challenge for our “number of days” outcome. In the 
primary model, we include over 93,000 corporal punishment cases as outcomes where the days of 
punishment is equal to zero days, but given that we include consequence type indicators, corporal 
punishment cases don’t help us identify our coefficient of interest, yet these cases do assist with 
precision in our models. In addition, our consequence type indicators essentially control for differences 
in length of consequence that are confounded with the type of consequence. For example, expulsions 




and referrals to alternative learning environments are very different kinds of consequences, and tend to 
also have many more days recorded with the consequence.4 
Furthermore, since each unit of analysis is a single observation, it is important to note that the 
coefficients we estimate are on a per infraction basis. This means that we are estimating the impact of 
race on the number of days punished per infraction, conditional on being in the infraction database to 
begin with. 
The baseline model is: 
_	












= number of days of punishment (instances of corporal punishment = 0 day) 
	
= a vector of race indicators for Black, Hispanic, Native American, Asian/Pacific Islander, and 
Two or More Races (White as baseline) 
	
= an indicator for special education student (1) or not (0) 
	
= a vector of grade indicators (with 8
th grade as the baseline) 
_	
= a vector of infraction indicators (disorderly conduct as the baseline) 
_	
 = a vector of indicators for first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seven or more 
infraction (student by school by year) plus last infraction (student by school by year) 
_	
= a vector of consequence indicators (ISS as the baseline) 
In cases where the outcome variable (days punished) is missing, the preferred model drops 
observations if the consequence was something that should reasonably have days attached (ISS, OSS, 
expulsion, ALE, or other). Dropping these observations reduces the analytic sample in our preferred 
                                                      
4 We also tested how much our results differ if we do not include these consequence type controls, and the estimates in 
our preferred models are more conservative (lower) than if we don’t control for consequence type. 




model from 651,804 to 590,750 (see Table 2). The majority of cases dropped were other (non-
specified) outcomes (57,751), followed by ALE (1,991).5 For example, if an incident of OSS was 
recorded, but without a days of punishment attached, in the primary model we just drop this 
observation, since the dependent variable is missing. All observations with a consequence of “no 
action” are coded with zero days, as this is an indication that no consequence was given. As noted 
earlier, all instances of corporal punishment are coded as zero days of punishment. The primary goal 
was to predict the amount of missed instructional time, so corporal punishment is not treated as a full 
day of missed time in the preferred model.6 
 The assumptions previously described built the preferred model, however, we provide results 
under various assumptions in Appendix A. In addition, since school practices related to recording these 
types of data may well be related to whether this dependent variable is missing, we have somewhat 
more confidence in the within-school estimates (which include school fixed effects). 
In sum, this model asks whether certain racial groups are receiving stricter (longer) 
punishments than their white peers (in the same grade and with the same special education status) in 
the state for the same infraction type and with similar infraction history. Next, we ask whether certain 
subgroups of students receive longer punishments than their peers within the same school.  
Research Question 2: After controlling further for the school that a student attends, are certain 
subgroups of students still more likely to receive longer punishments? That is, do different 
students in the same school receive differing punishments for the same types of infractions? 
                                                      
5 Of the 61,054 infractions dropped from the preferred model, relative to what we would expect from the larger sample, the 
infractions that were dropped were more likely to be for lower grade levels (kindergarten through fifth), more likely to be 
for non-FRL and non-Black students, and were more likely to occur in the third year of our sample (2012-13). Certain 
regions of the state were also more likely to not report the number of days for some of the consequence types that typically 
have days attached. Overall, however, 88% of the school-by-year combinations had no missing day issues, so these are 
concentrated in a small number of schools. 
6 Corporal punishment is still viewed by many as detrimental to students, regardless of the fact that a student is not missing 
class for days at a time as a result (American Psychological Association, 2015; Council of Europe, 2007; Flynn, 1999; 
Welsh et al., 1997). 




There are several reasons why discipline policies and outcomes should be compared within a 
specific school location, which justifies the use of school-fixed effects. First of all, policies are set 
locally, and will vary across the state. Even within a district, application of policies can vary by school 
due to differences in interpretation or implementation. Furthermore, school-fixed effects control for 
other school-level characteristics that could be associated with disciplinary outcomes (school climate, 
poverty levels, region, urban or rural classification, demographics, grade levels served, etc.). Most 
importantly, however, these fixed effects allow us to ask our second fundamental question. 
In Question 1, we asked whether certain types of students receive longer punishments for the 
same type of infraction across the state. It is possible that the disparities, if present, are the result of 
certain races being more likely to attend schools with longer punishments on average. Alternatively, it 
could be that, even within the same school, certain groups of students receive disproportionately severe 
punishments. To disentangle this relationship, Model 2 incorporates the same covariates in Model 1, 
with the addition of school level fixed effects.  
Model 2, for research question 2, including the addition of school-fixed-effects (#$) is: 
 !"	
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Researchers and policy makers may question whether apparent racial disparities might be 
correlated with income disparities. Thus, to test whether the driver of disproportionalities was actually 
economic disadvantage, we conduct parallel analyses in which we include a proxy for family income 
(free- and reduced- price lunch eligibility). These analyses test whether race still predicts disciplinary 
outcomes, above and beyond socio-economic status. If we find that the racial disparities are reduced, 
but there are disproportionalities based on FRL-status, it simply indicates that disproportionalities 




exist, but can be explained by demographic characteristics other than just race. Therefore, we include a 
robustness check with models that include an indicator for a student’s FRL status. 
Results 
Research Question 1: Are certain racial subgroups receiving stricter (longer) punishments than 
their White grade-level peers throughout the state? 
First, we compute racial differences in the number of days of consequence, controlling for other 
factors. The two non-White subgroups that we focus on are Black and Hispanic, which make up about 
21% and 10% of the state’s enrollment, respectively. Other races (Asian/Pacific Islander, Native 
American, and two or more races) make up a relatively small proportion of the state (less than 5%), so 
we do not discuss the results for these subgroups separately. It is important to note that, while Black 
students make up 21% of the state’s public school enrollment, they represent almost 44% of the 
disciplinary incidents included in our dataset. On the other hand, Hispanic students are more 
proportionally represented in the disciplinary data; they make up 10% of public school enrollment and 
9% of the disciplinary incidents. 
The first two columns in Table 3 correspond to the two research questions laid out. The results 
in column 1 of Table 3 indicate the state level disparities by race, and the results in column 2 indicate 
the disparities within school. The dependent variable is the total number of days of punishment, so our 
results indicate that Black students receive about 0.33 extra days of punishment per incident relative to 
White students in the state, holding the other covariates fixed. Hispanic students receive about 0.15 
days less per incident relative to White students in the state. 
We also test whether the inclusion of economic disadvantage in our model mitigates the racial 
impact on disciplinary outcomes (columns 3 and 4 of Table 3). Even controlling for FRL-eligibility as, 
the coefficients on Black and Hispanic are relatively unchanged both in terms of significance and 
magnitude, indicating that racial-disparities exist even above and beyond socioeconomic status. 




Differences by Infraction Type 
Analyzing observations of a single infraction category at a time serves as a robustness check for 
Model 1, as well as a potential indicator of where to focus policies to correct for the disparities. 
Subjective offenses (e.g. disorderly conduct and insubordination) have been linked to disparate 
application of discipline (Gregory & Weinstein, 2008; Skiba et al., 2011; Skiba et al., 2002), so we can 
compare disparities in these categories with those in more objective categories such as truancy. 
The results in Table 4 indicate that the longer punishments for Black students relative to their 
White peers varies in magnitude but is still statistically significant for each of the five most frequent 
infraction categories. We see disparities of about one third of a day for both disorderly conduct and 
insubordination (two subjective infractions), and an even larger disparity in the outcomes for fighting 
infractions. On the other hand, for the very objective infraction of truancy, we see that the racial disparity 
is much smaller (.08). In addition, Hispanic students tend to receive shorter punishments for disorderly 
conduct, other (non-specified) infractions, and insubordination. 
Research Question 2: After controlling further for the school that a student attends, are certain 
subgroups of students still more likely to receive longer punishments? That is, do different 
students in the same school receive differing punishments for the same types of infractions? 
Column 2 of Table 3 includes the same covariates as in Column 1, but with the addition of school fixed 
effects. In column 2, we find that the within school differences are much smaller than those in Column 
1. Black students receive about 0.07 extra days of punishment per incident relative to White students in 
the same school, and there is not a statistically significant difference between these outcomes for 
Hispanic and White students within the same school. 
We also compare how the coefficients on Black and Hispanic change with the addition of school-
fixed effects. Table 5 compares the coefficients on Black (panel A) and Hispanic (panel B) from Model 
1 (without school-fixed effects) and Model 2 (with school-fixed effects) for the overall dataset and for 




each of the five most common infractions, separately. Once school-fixed effects are employed and we 
examine within-school differences, the coefficient on Black always diminishes in magnitude and in some 
cases loses statistical significance or becomes negative. For example, Black students received about 0.72 
more days of punishment than White students across the state for fighting, but only 0.19 more days than 
White students within the same school. Statistically significant disproportionalities between Black 
students and White students at the state level for disorderly conduct and other (non-specified) infractions 
both lost statistical significance after the inclusion of school fixed effects. For Hispanic students, this 
trend is even more pronounced – all statistically significant differences at the state-level disappear in 
within-school analyses. Thus, any differences observed related to Hispanic students are due to 
differences in schools attended by Hispanic students. 
Robustness Checks 
Our dependent variable in the primary model was operationalized with a focus on days of 
punishment, driven by concern over missing instructional time, along with the belief that more days 
out of school might decrease a student’s engagement with the school. In this model, we include days of 
punishment for ISS and referrals to ALE in addition to more clearly exclusionary consequences such 
as OSS and expulsions. However, it could be that an ISS, for example, occurs without much loss of 
instruction. Appendix A presents the results of a robustness check that treats only the most clearly 
exclusionary discipline consequences (expulsion and OSS) as missed instructional days, and codes all 
other types of consequences including even things that have a number of days associated such as ISS 
and ALE referrals as zero days. The results from these models are in column 3 and 4 of Appendix A, 
which can be compared to the main results from Table 3 (which are reproduced in columns 1 and 2 of 
Appendix A). We see that the Black-White disparities both at the state-level and within-school remain 
significant but diminishes in magnitude, and the Hispanic-White disparity at the state-level is now 
zero. 




Lastly, we conduct a robustness check for our assumptions dealing with missing data. There were 
over 57,000 infractions in the original dataset that coded as an “other/non-specified” consequence, but 
with no days of punishment. In the primary analysis, since the outcome did not include a number of days, 
and because they are generally relatively less severe consequences,7 these were dropped, however we 
perform a robustness check for this decision. The results are in columns 5 and 6 of Appendix A. The 
substantive conclusion is generally the same as in our preferred models from Table 3 (reproduced in 
columns 1 and 2 of Appendix A), however, the coefficients on Black and Hispanic are slightly smaller. 
As an additional robustness check, separate analyses were run for eighth through twelfth grade 
and kindergarten through seventh grade, and the results were robust to this decision as well.8  
Discussion 
There are racial disparities in the length of disciplinary consequences imposed on students 
across the state of Arkansas. While our analyses confirm that fact, the real contribution of this study is 
measuring the different treatment of students with school fixed effects and controls for behavior. We 
find that, even after controlling for student infractions, there are large racial disproportionalities in the 
length of punishments across the state. However, the within-school disparities are much smaller. The 
good news is that, for the most part, educators within the same schools are not systematically 
administering more severe punishments to Black students for similar offenses. The bad news is that, 
statewide, Black students do systematically attend schools with more severe disciplinary responses. 
So what is driving these between school differences? One possible explanation for the 
difference between the state-level and school-level estimates of the Black-White disparity, for 
example, is that Black students could be disproportionately attending schools with stricter discipline 
                                                      
7 Conversations with the Arkansas Department of Education Assistant Commissioner for Research and Technology, Eric 
Saunders, indicates that the majority of these other consequences are detentions, bus suspensions, parent/guardian 
conferences, Saturday school, or warnings. 
8 These results can be made available at the reader’s request. 




policies. In fact, during this three year time period, schools with the greatest proportion of Black 
students did indeed hand out more suspensions and longer suspensions.9 It is possible as well that 
principal attitudes within different schools drive disciplinary practices. Raush and Skiba (2005) 
concluded that principals who blamed behavioral problems on poverty and poor parenting tended to 
employ more suspensions (Raush & Skiba, 2005). Similarly, Skiba et al. (2003) found greater use of 
preventative measures and lesser use of exclusionary measures in schools with principals who self-
reported a belief that suspension and expulsion were unnecessary. Further, in the national report, 
Opportunities Suspended (Advancement Project/Civil Rights Project, 2000), investigators suggested 
that the use of suspensions was closely aligned with the support for zero tolerance policies and 
procedures. With particular respect to racial disparities in disciplinary outcomes, Skiba et al. (2014) 
find that principal perspectives on discipline are also related to racial disparities in suspension and 
expulsion. Thus, it is possible that principals in schools with more Black students have particular 
beliefs about disciplinary strategies. In fact, the analysis of Welch and Payne (2010) revealed that 
school leaders serving higher proportions of Black students preferred more punitive disciplinary styles. 
Overall, then, our results are mostly consistent with the only other study to date that attempted 
to disentangle between-school and within-school drivers of racial disparities in disciplinary 
consequences (Skiba et al., 2014). In short, Black students overall are subject to stricter consequences, 
but the source of these differences appear to be differing schoolwide practices. In some ways, this 
finding might be viewed as a positive one for policymakers seeking remedies for these disparities. 
Rather than having to venture into every school building and work with school leaders who are treating 
Black students differently than their White peers for similar offenses, policymakers can focus their 
                                                      
9 To test whether this, we split the schools into quintiles by the percentage of students who are Black and analyzed the 
frequency and duration of various consequences within each quintile. 




strategies on the school sites where overly strict discipline is being practiced. And, using available data 
in many states, policymakers should be able to identify these schools.  
In terms of remedies, the infraction-specific models can provide state and local policy makers 
with an indication of which infraction types are most likely to result in disparate consequences. For 
example, the Black-White disparities within schools appear to be driven by incidences of fighting or 
insubordination. While in general, Hispanic students received shorter punishments than White 
students, Hispanic students do receive longer punishments than White students for fighting. Moreover, 
qualitative research on principal attitudes or other school-level factors could add to the knowledge base 
about why these disparities are occurring and how they might be minimized. In addition, subjective 
offenses (such as disorderly conduct and insubordination) have been linked to disparate application of 
discipline (Gregory & Weinstein, 2008; Skiba et al., 2011; Skiba et al., 2002). We see some evidence 
consistent with this given our results in Table 4, which shows large disproportionalities for Black 
students relative to White students at the state level, but these disparities are much smaller or 
insignificant within schools (Table 5).  
Most importantly, if policymakers can identify the schools that are meting out particularly high 
levels of exclusionary discipline, the next step is to offer strategies or resources for more effective 
discipline. Unfortunately, to date, there is a relatively thin literature on effective alternatives, but we 
discuss some of the available resources and research on alternatives in the next section. 
In 2014, the Department of Education and the Department of Justice released a package of 
resources and informational materials to assist with school climate and discipline (US Department of 
Education and US Department of Justice, 2014). In addition, many states have revised their laws, and 
many school districts have changed their policies to reduce reliance on out-of-schools suspensions for 
more minor offenses or for certain types of offenses. According to Steinberg and Lacoe (2017), as of 
May 2015, 22 states the District of Columbia had revised their laws in order to limit exclusionary 




discipline or implement more supportive and preventative strategies for at-risk students. In addition, as 
of the 2015–16 school year, 23 of the nation’s 100 largest school districts changed policies to require 
non-punitive discipline strategies and/or limit suspension use (Steinberg & Lacoe, 2017). There is also 
some promising evidence that revising student codes of conduct in this way can reduce the use of 
suspensions for minor offenses and limit the length of suspensions may be effective (Lacoe & 
Steinberg, 2017; Mader et al., 2016) and at little cost to school climate (Mader et al., 2016). 
Non-experimental evidence shows some reduction in referrals or suspensions and expulsions 
within certain programs such as Response to Intervention (RTI), which attempts to prevent recidivism 
by responding to behavioral issues as they arise, finds that office referrals decreased following RTI 
implementation (Fairbanks et al., 2007), restorative justice (Fronius et al., 2016), or some combination 
of these two strategies (Collins-Ricketts & Rambo, 2015).  
Further, there is some experimental evidence on School-Wide Positive Behavioral 
Interventions and Supports (SWPBIS a.k.a. PBIS) that indicates implementation of a PBIS framework 
has a variety of positive impacts such as decreases in office referrals (Flannery et al., 2014), and 
improvement in student perceptions of school safety and test scores (Horner et al., 2009). There is also 
some experimental evidence that the My Teacher Partner Program (MTP), which encourages focuses 
on teacher interactions with students reduced suspensions in the treatment group (Gregory et al., 2014). 
Finally, policymakers and researchers alike may view our current lack of knowledge alongside 
our growing interest in addressing this problem as an opportunity. Right now, there are practitioners 
and program representatives supporting a set of potentially effective interventions. At the same time, 
there are schools struggling with overly severe disciplinary policies and disparate disciplinary 
outcomes. This situation is ripe for policymakers to bring together practitioners and researchers to field 
numerous trials of these potentially effective strategies and rigorously study the results. If done well, 




systematically employing more preventative and intensive support structures and rigorously studying 
the outcomes could ultimately reduce the disproportionalities in total referrals as well. Most 
importantly, in the long run, this strategy might lead to improved outcomes for marginalized students. 
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Disorderly Conduct 173,400      29.4%
Insubordination 151,091      25.6%
Other (Non-specified) 122,925      20.8%
Fighting 49,128        8.3%
Truancy 46,410        7.9%
Bullying 16,506        2.8%
Tobacco 8,995          1.5%
Student Assault 6,996          1.2%
Drugs 6,390          1.1%
Miscellaneous* 8,909          1.5%
Total 590,750      100.0%
*Includes: Vandalism, Knife, Staff Assault, Alcohol, Gangs, Guns, Club, Explosives
Analytic Sample
Table 2: Arkansas K-12 Discipline Incidents by Consequence (2010-11 to 2012-13)
Number % Number %
In-School Suspension 261,759     40.2% 260,766     44.1%
Out-of-School Suspension 175,012     26.9% 174,850     29.6%
Other (Non-Specified) 111,785     17.2% 54,034       9.1%
Corporal Punishment 93,222       14.3% 93,222       15.8%
No Action 5,159         0.8% 5,159         0.9%
Referral to Alternative Learning Environment 3,021         0.5% 1,030         0.2%
Expulsion 1,846         0.3% 1,689         0.3%
Total 651,804     100.0% 590,750     100.0%
*Analytic sample excludes observations dropped for missing outcome variable, as noted in Methods section
# of Disiplinary 
Incidents Analytic Sample*





Table 3: OLS Regression of Days Punished Per Infraction, Arkansas K-12 (2010-11 to 2012-13)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Black 0.329 ** 0.072 ** 0.319 ** 0.071 **
(0.018) (0.021) (0.018) (0.021)
Hispanic -0.145 ** 0.012 -0.156 ** 0.011
(0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031)
Asian -0.007 0.106 -0.013 0.106
(0.093) (0.092) (0.093) (0.092)
Native American -0.142 ** 0.035 -0.148 ** 0.035
(0.052) (0.048) (0.052) (0.048)
Two or More Races -0.048 0.019 -0.054 0.019
(0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037)
SPED Status -0.099 ** -0.099 ** -0.101 ** -0.099 **
(0.023) (0.020) (0.023) (0.020)
FRL Status 0.056 ** 0.003
(0.014) (0.014)
Expulsion 53.36 ** 53.23 ** 53.36 ** 53.23 **
(1.860) (1.850) (1.860) (1.850)
Constant 2.078 ** 2.334 ** 2.044 ** 2.332 **
(0.040) (0.043) (0.041) (0.044)
Grade Indicators X X X X
Infraction Type Indicators X X X X
Infraction Order Indicators X X X X
Consequence Indicators X X X X
School Fixed Effects X X
Observations 590,750 590,750 590,750 590,750
Adjusted R-Squared 0.3749 0.3994 0.3632 0.3882
Notes Coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered at the student level in parentheses.
**p<.01, *p<.05
Dependent variable = count of number of days of punishment.
Preferred model: dropped if missing days punished (except No Action = 0 and Corporal Punishment = 0).
Baseline grade: 8th. Baseline infraction: disorderly conduct. Baseline consequence: ISS.
Infraction order indicators include: indicators for first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh or more, 
plus an indicator for last infraction (baseline = 6th infraction).




Table 4: OLS Regression of Days Punished by Infraction, Arkansas K-12 (2010-11 to 2012-13)
Black 0.366 ** 0.331 ** 0.160 ** 0.716 ** 0.083 **
(0.029) (0.021) (0.030) (0.049) (0.029)
Hispanic -0.279 ** -0.125 ** -0.210 ** 0.162 0.0864
(0.033) (0.048) (0.038) (0.086) (0.073)
Asian -0.239 -0.160 -0.099 0.213 0.296 **
(0.141) (0.112) (0.072) (0.140) (0.081)
Native American -0.262 ** 0.078 -0.168 ** -0.173 -0.196 *
(0.050) (0.140) (0.055) (0.194) (0.093)
Two or More Races -0.141 ** -0.049 -0.055 0.100 -0.067
(0.050) (0.048) (0.060) (0.130) (0.060)
SPED Status -0.180 ** -0.050 0.01 -0.154 ** 0.033
(0.032) (0.030) (0.047) (0.055) (0.047)
Expulsion 46.95 ** 34.55 ** 61.43 ** 39.28 ** 27.53 **
(4.259) (4.868) (6.381) (5.836) (6.781)
Constant 1.975 ** 1.909 ** 1.806 ** 3.233 ** 2.060 **
(0.053) (0.051) (0.047) (0.121) (0.053)
Grade Dummies Y Y Y Y Y
Infraction Order Dummies Y Y Y Y Y
Consequence Dummies Y Y Y Y Y
School fixed effects N N N N N
Observations 173,400 151,091 122,925 49,128 46,410
Adjusted R-Squared 0.2999 0.2434 0.3647 0.2695 0.2216
**p<.01, *p<.05
Dependent variable = count of number of days of punishment.
Baseline grade: 8th. Baseline consequence: ISS.
Preferred model: dropped if days punished was missing (except No Action set to 0 and Corporal Punishment set to 0)
Infraction order dummies include: dummies for first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh or more, plus a dummy for last 
infraction (baseline = 6th infraction).
Disorderly Conduct Insubordination Other Fighting Truancy
Notes Coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered at the student level in parentheses.




Table 5: Race Coefficients from Model 2 and Model 3, Overall and for 5 Most Frequent Infractions 
Panel A: Coefficents on Black Panel B: Coefficients on Hispanic
Overall 0.329 ** 0.072 ** Overall -0.145 ** 0.012
-0.018 (0.021) (0.032) (0.031)
Disorderly Conduct 0.366 ** 0.0478 Disorderly Conduct -0.279 ** -0.046
-0.029 (0.031) (0.033) (0.028)
Insubordination 0.331 ** 0.078 ** Insubordination -0.125 ** 0.045
-0.021 (0.026) (0.048) (0.050)
Other 0.160 ** 0.003 Other -0.210 ** -0.035
(0.030) (0.028) (0.038) (0.037)
Fighting 0.716 ** 0.187 ** Fighting 0.162 0.133
(0.049) (0.055) (0.086) (0.072)
Truancy 0.083 ** -0.073 * Truancy 0.086 0.125
(0.029) (0.035) (0.073) (0.083)
Notes: The overall effects come from Table 3, Columbs 2 and 3, which both control for the type of infraction.
**p<.01, *p<.05





Both sets of infraction-specific models control for race, special education status, grade, infraction order, 
and type of consequence received.
The second column in each panel also includes school-fixed effects.
State-Level




Appendix A: Robustness Checks 
Table A1: OLS Regression of Days Punished on Race, Arkansas K-12 (2010-11 to 2012-13) 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Black 0.329 ** 0.072 ** 0.174 ** 0.057 ** 0.274 ** 0.055 **
(0.018) (0.021) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.019)
Hispanic -0.145 ** 0.012 0.020 0.010 -0.116 ** 0.006
(0.032) (0.031) (0.020) (0.019) (0.028) (0.027)
Asian -0.007 0.106 0.058 0.090 0.009 0.100
(0.093) (0.092) (0.067) (0.070) (0.080) (0.080)
Native American -0.142 ** 0.035 0.004 0.001 -0.098 * 0.036
(0.052) (0.048) (0.031) (0.031) (0.046) (0.044)
Two or More Races -0.048 0.019 0.071 ** 0.043 -0.041 -0.013
(0.038) (0.037) (0.023) (0.022) (0.032) (0.034)
SPED Status -0.099 ** -0.099 ** -0.109 ** -0.108 ** -0.094 ** -0.095 **
(0.023) (0.020) (0.014) (0.014) (0.021) (0.019)
Expulsion 53.36 ** 53.23 ** 50.85 ** 50.76 ** 53.4 ** 53.29 **
(1.860) (1.850) (1.756) (1.747) (1.861) (1.850)
Constant 2.078 ** 2.334 ** 0.078 ** 0.164 ** 2.033 ** 2.266 **
(0.040) (0.043) (0.030) (0.034) (0.037) (0.040)
Grade Indicators X X X X X X
Infraction Type Indicators X X X X X X
Infraction Order Indicators X X X X X X
Consequence Indicators X X X X X X
School Fixed Effects X X X
Observations 590,750 590,750 651,804 651,804 648,501 648,501
Adjusted R-Squared 0.3749 0.3994 0.4434 0.4531 0.3661 0.3884
Notes: Coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered at the student level in parentheses.
**p<.01, *p<.05
Dependent variable = count of number of days of punishment.
Primary Models (From 
Table 3)
Robustness Check #1 (All 
except OSS and Expulsion 
= 0 Days)
Primary Model: dropped if missing days punished (except No Action = 0 and Corporal Punishment = 0). In this 
primary model, instances of missing or zero days for "other/non-specified infractions" were dropped.
Robustness Check #2 
(Missing or Zero days of 
"Other" Imputed as 1)
Robustness Check #1: All consequences except OSS and Expulsion coded as zero days. Instances of missing or zero 
days for "other/non-specified infractions" were included as zero days.
Robustness Check #2: Days of punishment imputed = 1 if there was an instance of missing or zero days for an 
"other/non-specified" infraction.
Baseline grade: 8th. Baseline infraction: disorderly conduct. Baseline consequence: ISS.
Infraction order indicators include: indicators for first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh or more, plus an 
indicator for last infraction (baseline = 6th infraction).
